dobedobedo!

2005-11-21T16:13:00.000-08:00

apparently my last comment was pretty 'pointless' (for fucks sake!) so here's some more 'information' about the two dobes.

The dobes both lived,.since their early teens? (and still do for some of the year) in the same part of 'scum'bridge where they were both members of the infamous 'quarry bank crew' which is where they first met. about 3 years ago, when both were young -but not innocent ;) -they started going out for the 1st time, however, as part of what would become tradition, this was not to last more than mere weeks - although the dobes did manage to kill many hours chatting (and poking each other) on the local 'bank' and dobe fondly remembers one trip in particular to the tate modern.

After this, they were on and off a further couple more times, and although they havent seen each other much in the last year as they spend most their time in different halves of the country, the dobes still remain close and as they always have, manage to spend many hours (and pounds on phone bills) talking about everything and nothing.

This has all made for one confusing yet intriquing relationship, particularly for dobe the second! however this dobe for sure fails to ever get bored by the whole saga, and would hate to be in a situation where the dobes weren't often annoying each other for he has never met anyone quite like dobe the first =) (or for that matter anyone who can take the piss quite as much!)

and on that note is promising to call dobe (for a change) later this week, if she isn't being too cool and/or busy??

xxx

Oh dear!

2005-11-13T13:33:00.000-08:00

omg dobe is such a geek!

well done on the first and so called 'publishable material'..but posting it as a site entry..showing off i think!

a bit of explanation for those who aren't us two...
the dobes are; ellie,19 (girl!) and sam,21 (boy!)

sam is at warwick doing some geeky intellectual historical type degree (though when he comes to the end of his third year it will probably be a bit useless for finding a decent job)...and ellie is doing a fashion management degree at lcf (which most people don't believe is actualy a degree course anyway!).

..and as students we have far too much time on our hands..hence the site!

anyways..dobe il probs call u later..been a stressfull weekened without my mobile/calling u!

xxxxxx

dobe gets a first!

2005-11-10T17:08:00.000-08:00

yay! despite the efforts of dobe to sabotage my essay writing time through repeated phone calls =p, actually got a first in my Politics essay today. very happy with that, and have been persuaded to share it, so enjoy. (look out for the typos!!)

Does globalisation inevitably lead to the end of the nation-state?

Much of the discourse surrounding globalisation has focused upon the fate of the state and more specifically whether the demise of the nation-state is inevitable. With the globalisation literature encompassing titles such as ‘the obsolescence of the state’, ‘the retreat of the state’ and the ‘extinction of nation-states’[1] it is clear that hyperglobalists have made a strong connection between globalisation and fate[2] - ‘Indeed, the state itself is in its death throes, we are constantly told. For this is the era of ‘civil society’ and ‘postmodernity’, of ‘global society’ and the transnational market.’ [3] However, such a claim is based largely on supposition, lacking concrete empirical evidence. Certainly the role of the nation-state has shifted in the globalising world and a strong case, as I shall show, can be placed on the interpretation that the age of West Phalian statism has been diminished as we witness a new degree of ‘polycentrism’[4] in global governance and regulation. However such a shift does not need imply that the state is dieing nor is its death inevitable. Globalisation has infringed upon the sovereignty of the state in several ways yet it remains a major actor, in fact, ultimately the primary actor in most aspects of global governance. However, just as the hyperglobalists tend to exaggerate the impact of globalism upon the nation-state, continuity theorists and political realists place too little emphasise on the changes in governance emerging from the phenomenon. For the most part, the best case is put forward by those who propose whilst character of the state has shifted while the existence of the nation-state has not been threatened.

Before one can analyse the extent to which globalisation is impacting upon the state, it is important define what the process or processes that comprise globalisation are. The term ‘globalisation’ is a contested concept in itself and is often used in obscure terms. The use of the word has been criticised by some political scientists because the term is often giving different meanings often obscuring and confusing the debate.[5] Consequently much as been written about ‘global babble’ and ‘globaloney’[6] questioning the use of the term in sociological studies. Furthermore, there are not only those who dismiss the use of the term because of its use as competing labels, but there are those sceptics who fundamentally reject its use because they believe the term can’t offer anything new to political or economic discourses because, simply, there is nothing new happening in these fields that either cant be explained using previous terms and conceptions such ‘internationalism’ or ‘westernisation’. The sceptic Linda Weiss, for example, believes that globalisation is nothing more than ‘strong internationalization’[7] Indeed globalisation does include processes that overlap and resemble other concepts, yet the last half century has witnessed a huge acceleration in transplanetary connections, creating a new sense of globality dissimilar to anything previously seen, as Scholte argues ‘Global connections have certain antecedents in earlier centuries, but they have figured as a pervasive, major aspect of social life mainly since the middle of the twentieth century.’[8]

Using the definition of globalisation as accelerated transplanetary connections, I accept the argument proposed by the hyperglobalists that globalization is indeed a distinctive and an important development in contemporary history yet, like sceptics, do not accept that increased globality will necessary lead to the end of the nation-state. To claim otherwise would be recklessly presumption. As Gamble notes:

The international system is based upon the recognition and importance of the nation-state, and non-interference in the affairs of the nation-states which together compromise the UN is regarded as a fundamental principle, which is why it has proved so difficult ever to get UN support for breaching it, even in the case of Kosovo in 1999.

The familiar world of nations and their states, with their flags and sports teams, their national anthems and national airlines, national cultures and national capitalisms, is what we are being told is being hollowed out by the forces of globalization.’[9]

Yet despite the central role of the nation-state in global governance and the existence of national cultural affiliations, globalisation is a new phenomenon undermining state sovereignty. A great deal of the globalisation literature has focused on the implications of greater globality for the state provision and regulation of social welfare arguing that the growth of transworld relations have put considerable downward pressures on state guarantees of social protection suggesting that nation-states are moving from ‘welfare states’ to ‘competition states,’ leading to a ‘Race to the Bottom’.[10] The argument states that tax competition causes a decline in tax rate and thus in tax revenues, and this lowers both the level of the public good an the revenue surplus of the government. States must compete with governments in other countries if they want to attract factors that are internationally mobile. The argument proclaims that competition has emerged in which countries with the weakest workplace safety laws, the lowest taxes, and the toughest unionization laws win investment in the market economy. Scholte points to ‘transition economies’ in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experiencing major declines in state provision of social services.[11] Trends do seem to highlight that states are becoming increasingly competitive for internationally mobile capital yet whether the nation-states are really losing significant fiscal capabilities remains unclear as Lorz notes: ‘although some tax changes have taken place… the welfare state has not collapsed and that tax sources other than immobile labour have still contributed substantially to the financing of the welfare state.’[12]

Various economic models have been drawn up theorising the relationship between capital mobility and tax rates, often with different conclusions. The empirical evidence itself is inconclusive and far from definitive. In the OECD countries between 1970 and 1999, the empirical data does not show a race to the bottom,. Instead, total tax revenues increased from 28.8 per cent of GDP to 37.3 per cent of GDP in 1999 yet according to UNCTAD (1996), the use of fiscal incentives to attract FDI, such as tax holidays, has increased in Europe, the United States, and Canada since the mid-1980s.[13] The data implies, that a growth in tax incentives for mobile capital has arisen with the rise of globalisation yet the extent to which this has impacted upon welfare systems has depended upon state choice and adaptability, with strong states in the North having more room to manoeuvre than developing states. Scholte notes that states have responded in different ways to the economic pressures of globalisation, pointing to higher cuts in welfare provision among strongly neo-liberal countries such as Australia and the USA whilst the more social democratic governments of Denmark and the Netherlands have been able to maintain relatively high standards.[14] Furthermore to fully understand changes and shifts in welfare systems, one must look beyond the role of globalisation (or more accurately market-liberalism) and look at the nature of the state itself and the range of challenges it faces in policy choice:

In any case it would be overly simplistic to attribute developments in Northern welfare states entirely to globalization… Circumstances like ageing populations, altered family patterns, transformations in labour markets, government budget deficits, increased costs of health care and the rise of neo-liberalist ideology all presented challenges to social welfare.[15]

It is worth noting that both sides of the debate have tended to define globalisation as liberalism and sceptics such as Weiss solely, to the detriment of their argument, focus primarily on globalisation as economic internationalism. However, this is only one area in which state sovereignty has been challenged in the globalised era. Taking globalisation to be the acceleration or increase in transplanetary connections, quite clearly modern global communications technology has played a major role in undermining statism. Using the West Phalian model of statism as a source of comparison, where the state were conceived as the single source of governance in its territory and answerable to no other forms of governance, it is possible to identify a clear shift in the character of the contemporary nation-state. Modern technologies have allowed for global transfers of information via satellites, radios and the Internet. Such electronic mass media has undermined the state’s ability to control language and education and modern governments now confront a ‘borderless world’, not only with respect to flows of technology, investment and money. According to Ohmae, of ‘all the forces eating them [territorial boundaries] away, perhaps the most persistent is the flow of information.’ In the age of West Phalian statism, governments could monopolize information ‘cooking it up as they saw fit’ but clearly with the advancements made in modern global communications this is no longer possible.[16] Furthermore, communications technology has facilitated the growth of transnational bonds undermining national identities, leading to a greater global consciousness. Conversely, yet equally damaging to statism is the move by some people away from state to localities t. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to argue that we have indeed moved into the ‘twilight of sovereignty’[17]. Yet the passing of statism in this sense, does not imply that the state itself will pass, in fact, ‘just as territoriality has remained important with the passing of territorialism, so states have remained important with the passing of statism.’[18] States themselves have never been fixed entities and as Jarvis and Paolini note, states have always been ‘in motion, evolving, adapting, incorporating… always in some condition of transition.’[19]

The growth in sub and supranational identities has also been mirrored in governance with the emergence of ‘multi scalar’ governance and a new polycentrism.[20] Regulation has been increasingly diffused above and below to new levels of governance. Increased transplanetary connections has led to unprecedented amounts of global governance. Global issues such as HIV/AIDS, refugee movements and climate change require global solutions. Moreover technological developments have permitted huge transplanetary money flows, the creation of the Internet and for millions of people from across the globe to fly internationally. Consequently transplanetary connections of this variety require transplanetary regulation which becomes not only ‘unavoidable’ but also ‘indispensable’[21]. As a result, several thousand multilateral agreements on environmental issues, regulation of health and finance and global trade have emerged in recent decades. The UN, the Bretton woods institutions, the WTO, the BIS, the OECD, are strong examples of governance bodies with global remits and the IMF and the World Bank each maintain resident missions in over 70 countries.[22]

Beneath the state, regions and cities across the globe have formed strong ties without any intermediation from national government through various networks such as the World Association of Major Metropolises and the World Organization of United Cities and Local Governments. Modern communications and shared issues, such as air corridors and capital flows have permitted and required action at this substate level. Many substate and suprastate actors have obtained a degree of autonomy from states and have the ability to take initiatives on their own behalf. The effect of this new polycentrism of regulation however, varies from state to state, with weaker states more susceptible to influence and control from other levels of governance. The World Bank and IMF for example have made lending to Ghana conditional on opening up agricultural markets, including the rice market. Subsequently Ghana’s domestic rice production has now collapsed and the US provides 40% of Ghanaian rice imports.[23] Stronger states largely dominate these new bodies through interacting and moulding them in a fashion that best suits their interests.

Ultimately global governance shows no sign of becoming global government. In assessing the importance of nation-states it is important to look at the work of political realists. They argue, quite correctly, that states themselves have played a major role in the promotion of globalisation and the use of international organisations as promotion of self-interest. The role of states in globalisation and international relations should not be downplayed and proponents of political realism theory such as Gilpin, Kennedy and Nye focus upon the role of the US as a hegemony and argue that globalization can be explained as a way that the hegemon has asserted its primacy by creating an environment of controlled competition between states so that it can advance its own interest. The US’s prominent role in the creation and its dominance of global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation highlights the role of the hegemon in the spread of political-economic interpretation of globalisation. Waltz argues that globalization is largely made in America, that is, current institutions and rules that sustain and promote the global economy are under American control.[24] The state, in the case of the US, has not lost power; in fact the state has expanded its functions and its control over societies and economies at home and abroad. Again the impact of globalisation will vary amongst states, with some acting as catalysts behind globalism and others falling victim to it. Overall however, no other actor can match the state in terms of its capabilities and successes: ‘States perform essential political, social and economic functions, and no other organization rivals them in these respects. They foster the institutions that make internal peace and prosperity possible.’[25] States may been have lost sovereignty, but as realists maintain, no other actor can compete with their overall power and influence. Fundamentally we look to states as the most potent and legitimate political units and they still have a monopoly over the legal use of coercive power.

Rather obviously political realisms suffer from the fact that they are overtly one-dimensional in their conceptualisation of globalisation and focus too narrowly upon international power relations, failing to acknowledge other important components of globalization and other actors in global governance. However political realists are important as a counter-weight to hyperbolists, particularly liberalists, who fail to value the importance of states in global governance and in international relations.

Without falling into the hyperbole generated by much of the hyperglobalist camp, it is possible to identify processes that constitute a new phenomena that can be placed under the term ‘globalisation’ and remain independent from older concepts. By this definition globalisation is something new and it is transforming the role of the nation-state. The growth of transplanetary connections over the last half-century has promoted several significant shifts in the character of the state costing them a degree of autonomy and often the ability to act unilaterally on some global issues.

Yet whilst the age of statism in the West Phalian sense may be ending, many of the more extreme claims of the hyperglobalist remain unconvincing with little evidence supporting the link between globalisation and an inevitable demise of the nation-state. As the main provider of welfare provision, military protection, law and regulation the state has (to varying degrees) been undermined in these functions, yet the nation-state itself has never been fixed in character and are ‘always in the process of formation, change and potential decay.’[26] Nation-states have been malleable and adaptive in nature and the challenges of globalisation have done much to re-shape their character, shifting sovereignty beyond the traditional West Phalian conception sovereignty. Yet the importance of states should not be denied. The state system may not endure indefinitely, at least not in a recognisable form, but globalisation does not inevitably lead to the demise of the state, for ‘there is no basis to assumptions that globality and the state are inherently contradictory.’[27]

2005-11-09T17:04:00.000-08:00

yay! the password and username finally worked!

thanks dobe, I'm very impressed with the dobe site, I think it has a lot of potential and I think we are going to bemuse alot of people with our bizarre relationship!

ps no need to apologise for rudeness, I know you love me really ;)

dobe the 2nd approves!

2005-11-09T16:49:00.000-08:00

Yay dobe approves!

doobs im gonna give you the username and password now, but dont abuse my(/our) lovely site!

xxxxxxxxxx

the birth of the dobe site!

2005-11-09T16:32:00.000-08:00

Hello!
This site is in honour of dobe..and dobe..!
Mainly as an apology to a special certain someone ; ) as I was rude earlier.

Well to those of u who aren't us two, I hope you find our site (and relationship) intriguing..any comments/suggestions do share!

xxxxxxxxxx